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Abstract
In today’s highly connected cyber-physical world,
people are constantly disclosing personal and sensitive
data to different organizations and other people through
the use of online and physical services. Such data
disclosure activities can lead to unexpected privacy
issues. However, there is a general lack of tools that
help to improve users’ awareness of such privacy issues
and to make more informed decisions on their data
disclosure activities in wider contexts. To fill this
gap, this paper presents a novel user-centric, data-flow
graph based semantic model, which can show how a
given user’s personal and sensitive data are disclosed
to different entities and how different types of privacy
issues can emerge from such data disclosure activities.
The model enables both manual and automatic analysis
of privacy issues, therefore laying the theoretical
foundation of building data-driven and user-centric
software tools for people to better manage their data
disclosure activities in the cyber-physical world.
1. Introduction
Living in a highly digitized and networked world and
the wider cyber-physical space, people are interacting
with organizations and other people more and more
frequently via different kinds of online and offline
(physical) services and products. In addition to
providing basic services, it is a common practice for
service providers to share customers’ personal data
with other third-party organizations, such as advertisers,
insurers and relevant governmental bodies, due to legal
requirements or some business reasons (e.g., to offer
more personalized services). Furthermore, many people
actively share information about their lives online with
other people, e.g., on online social networks (OSNs)
and web forums, which further extends the scale of data
sharing. All such data sharing activities can lead to
∗ An extended version of the paper can be found at http://
www.hooklee.com/Papers/HICSS2020_full.pdf.
different kinds of privacy issues, caused by personal
data flowing from the user (i.e., the data owner) to
different entities in the cyber-physical world, directly or
indirectly.
Certain privacy issues are actually caused by
self-disclosures by the users themselves [1]. Past work
was mostly designed to address “known events” such
as decisions on data collection, access and processing,
however insufficient work has been done towards
privacy issues related to data flows unknown to users.
To help reduce self-disclosures and associated privacy
issues [2], it is necessary to keep users aware of data
flows that can lead to possible privacy issues. In
this context, many researchers have proposed to use a
privacy related ontology or other conceptual models to
systematically formalize knowledge about privacy by
“explicit concepts and relations”, in order to discover
“implicit facts” (i.e., privacy issues or risks) [3].
With enhanced awareness, further privacy enhancement
mechanisms can be adopted to help managing such
privacy risks, e.g., adjusting access control or privacy
policies, removing unused data, switching to more
privacy-friendly services, and using privacy software
tools to automatically block unwanted data disclosure.
Specially, privacy nudging has also been proposed as
a mechanism for a privacy-aware computing system
to nudge users towards data disclosure decisions that
protect their privacy better [4].
Most past theoretical work on privacy ontologies
and concept modeling focuses either on high-level
concepts or a narrow aspect or application domain
(e.g., privacy policies, OSNs). So far, we have not
seen any work focusing on user-centric data flows
across different types of data consumers (services,
organizations, other people, etc.). This paper fills this
gap by proposing a novel user-centric and graph-based
model for formalizing personal data flows that may
lead to privacy issues. The model is generic enough
to cover a wide range of data disclosure activities
of people in the cyber-physical world. The model
can be seen as an privacy-oriented data disclosure
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ontology, allowing manual and automatic analysis of
known and unknown privacy issues represented as
special topological patterns on a directed graph. The
model lays the theoretical foundation of software tools
that can be used by individual users (i.e., data owners
rather than organizations and researchers) themselves to
monitor their data disclosure activities and help provide
opportunities to adapt their behaviors towards a better
trade-off between privacy protection and values gained
through data disclosures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 defines the proposed model in details. A
number of case studies in two application categories are
discussed in Section 3, in order to demonstrate how the
proposed model can be used to identify different types of
privacy issues. In Section 4, we discuss how automated
semantic reasoning can be done based on the proposed
model, which can be implemented with existing web
ontology tools. Other related works and possible future
directions are discussed in Sections 5 and 6.
2. The proposed model
In this section, we first give two example scenarios
about privacy issues related to data disclosures, to
illustrate what real-world problems the proposed model
aims at solving. Then, we formally explain basic
concepts behind the proposed graph model. Finally, we
show how privacy issues can be studied by analyzing
different types of edges in the proposed graph model.
2.1. Example scenarios
As stated, the proposed model aims at empowering
users with more knowledge (i.e., awareness) on their
data disclosure activities and automated tools to detect
potential privacy issues that will be neglected otherwise.
Thus, it is expected that the model can be used to help
users make more informed data disclosure decisions in
different scenarios such as the following ones.
Scenario 1: Data released to service providers.
Alice uses different travel services to arrange her
trip to China. She has to share certain personal
information with almost all such services without a
clear understanding of what organizations behind those
services actually see the data. Due to propagation
among service providers, she worries her data
containing sensitive attributes may end up with some
organizations she distrusts. What’s more, particular
combinations of attributes may cause identification. She
would like to prevent that from happening.
Scenario 2: Data released to other people. Alice
uses online social media nearly every day to record her
life. She interacts with her family members, colleagues,
friends and other people on Facebook, Twitter, and
Instagram by sharing various contents. Now she is
traveling in China and is eager to share the experience
but her accurate positions (She is privacy cautious.). She
worries the propagation of posts will make the landmark
photos (shared on Instagram) and her real-time locations
at the city or country level (shared on Facebook) viewed
by the same people connected on different platforms.
Besides, she wants to post travel-related contents with
a group of people who are not on the working contact
list. It will be helpful to have a tool monitoring data
flows so that she can decide what to do in future.
2.2. The model: basic concepts
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Figure 1: The entity-type graph of proposed model
At a higher level of conceptualization, our proposed
model can be formalized as a directed graph describing
how personal data of people can possibly flow through
(i.e., may be disclosed to) different types of entities
in a cyber-physical world, as shown in Fig. 1.1
Mathematically, such a graph can be denoted by G =
(V, E), where V = {Vi}Mi=1 is a set of M nodes and
each node Vi represents a specific type of entities with
the same semantic meaning in our model (depicted by
ellipses), and E = {Ej}Nj=1 is a set of N edges and each
edge Ej represents a specific type of relations between
two entity types. Edges in G can be categorized into two
different groups: edges representing semantic relations
and edges representing data flows (depicted by solid
and dashed arrows, respectively, in Fig. 1). Note that
in Fig. 1, when there is “...” included in the textual
1Names of edges in Fig. 1 are not actually part of the conceptual
model. They are used for enhancing readability and for informing
naming of predicates in Table 1. The dashed edges are numbered to
help discuss data flows in the rest of the paper.
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label of an edge there should actually be multiple edges
(only one is shown for the sake of simplicity) due to the
existence of multiple semantic relations between the two
corresponding entity types (e.g., a service is provided by
a company but owned by another, which have different
implications on data flows).
The entity type level graph G can only show entity
types and possible relations between different entities,
but not the actual entities and relations (e.g., concrete
data flows between two organizations/people) that are
what we need to work with for detecting and analyzing
privacy issues. To this end, we will need entity level
graphs. Each of such graphs is a different directed graph
G = (V,E), where V = {v|v ∈ Vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ M} is a
set of nodes each representing an entity (i.e., an instance
of a specific entity type / node in G) and E = {e|e ∈
Ej , 1 ≤ j ≤ N} is a set of edges each representing
a relation (i.e., an instance of a specific relation type /
edge in G). Some concrete examples of such entity level
models/graphs will be given in Section 3.
The entity types can be categorized into three
groups: 1) physical entities that exist only in the physical
world; 2) cyber entities that exist only in the cyber
world (from user’s perspective); 3) hybrid entities that
may exist in both cyber and/or physical world. In
Fig. 1, the 7 different entity types are colored differently
to show which group(s) each entity type belongs to
(gray: physical, white: cyber, gradient: hybrid). In the
following we explain what these types represent.
Person (P) stands for natural people in the physical
world. The model is user-centric, i.e., about a special P
entity “me” – the user for whom the model is built.
Data (D) refers to atomic data items about “me”
(e.g., “my name”). Data entities may be by nature in the
physical world, or in the cyber world, or in both worlds.
Service (S) refers to different physical and online
services that serve people for a specific purpose (e.g.,
a travel agent helping people to book flights).
Data Package (DP) refers to specific combinations
of data entities required by one or more services. In
this model, DP entities can be seen as encapsulated data
disclosed in a single transaction.
Organization (O) refers to organizations that relate
to one or more services (e.g., service providers).
Online Account (OA) refers to “virtual identities”
existing on online services.
Online Group (OG) refers to “virtual groups” of
online accounts that exist on a specific online service.
2.3. The model: edges
As stated before, each edge (i.e., relation type) in the
entity level graph G, and hence each edge (i.e., relation
of a specific type) in an entity level graphG, belongs to
one of two groups of edges (relations). We explain these
two edge groups in greater details below.
The first edge group is about semantic relations
that may or may not relate directly to personal data
flows. For instance, the edge connecting entity types P
and D means that the special P entity “me” owns some
personal data items. Unlike the second group of edges
that can cause immediate privacy impacts, the first group
of edges help modeling the “evidence” about how and
why data may flow among these entities.
The second edge group is about data flows from a
source entity to a destination entity. Most edges in this
group are accompanied by semantic relation edges in the
first group because the latter constructs the reason why
a data flow can possibly occur.
To facilitate future discussions on data flows, we
introduce a more loosely defined concept “data flow
edge type” (and simply “edge type” when ambiguity or
confusion will not arise) denoted by Ej , the set of all
data flow edges between a specific pair of entity types
labeled by the same number j in Fig. 1. Accordingly,
we use ej-k to denote the k-th edge of the loose edge
type Ej in an entity level graph G, in order to give
each individual edge in G a unique label. Note that Ej
can cover multiple edges in G and G (e.g., data flows
between S and O entities) and it conceptually differs
from Ej .
The first data flow edge normally happens between
DP and S entities, denoted by E1. The edge type E12
refers to potential bidirectional data flows between P
and O entities, mapped to different types of semantic
relations between P and O entities, e.g., a person owns a
company. The edge types E5 and E8 refer to data flows
from an S entity to an OA or an OG entity. The edge type
E7 refers to data flows from an OA to a P entity (i.e., a
human user of an online account). The edge type E10
refers to data flows caused by social relationships among
people (e.g., friendship and familial ties). The edge type
E11 refers to data flows from an S entity directly to a
person (i.e, not via an OA entity), e.g., a person can see
public tweets on Twitter.
The relations and data flows represented by edges
between people (P), services (S) and organizations (O)
can be complicated in real world. Particularly, in
Fig. 1 for each edge (between S and O, from S to
S and from O to O) there can be multiple different
semantic relations and data flows, e.g., a service is
provided by an organization (i.e., a service provider),
a service is outsourced to, supplied by or powered
by another service, an organization is part of, in
partnership with or invested by another organization.
In this work we do not intend to cover a complete list
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of such complicated business relations, but focus on
the conceptual abstraction needed to capture all such
relations.
Unlike privacy issues caused by data collection
activities of services, privacy issues of online
communities (such as OSNs) are mostly related to
how well users manage the visibility of personal data
[5]. For instance, with “friends only” and “members
only” as privacy settings, contents shared on private
spaces can be viewed by friends and group members
only. In our proposed model, the edges between OA,
OG and P entities (E5, . . . , E10) describe how personal
data can possibly flow among such entities.
2.4. “Topological” privacy issues
For a given user “me”, if we can construct an entity
level graph G, which shows relevant entities, semantic
relations and data flows, we will be able to study a
number of different types of privacy issues concerning
this given user, e.g., if the user is disclosing too much
information to a single service or organization, if the
user has disclosed too much personal information to
other people or the general public. Even when the
graphG is incomplete, which is likely the case for most
scenarios due to the lack of complete details about the
user, some privacy issues may still be identified.
Within the proposed model, we can define an
important concept: a “data-flow path” is a sequence
of consecutive data flows (edges in an entity level
graph G). This concept allows us to map different
“privacy issues” to certain topological patterns that are
formed by one or more data-flow paths. Different
privacy issues may share the same topological pattern
but follow different edges or different edge types, e.g.,
one privacy issue may be related to one organization
while another to a different organization. Beyond using
the model to detect privacy issues, we can also try to
quantify the risk of a given privacy issue and provide
possible solutions to the user. Some concrete examples
about such privacy issues will be discussed in the next
section with a number of imaginary but realistic case
studies. In addition to investigating privacy issues, it
deserves mentioning that the proposed model can also
find applications in other contexts, e.g., studying how
personal data are consumed by online services (even if
there are no privacy issue for any particular user).
3. Case studies
3.1. Privacy issues related to service providers
Figure 2 shows the simplest model involving S and
O entities: an online service <service 1> connects to
a service provider <provider 1> by semantic relation
edge providedBy, denoted by providedBy(service 1,
provider 1). For instance, an E1 flow e1-1 at the
beginning could cause an E2 flow e2-1 from <service
1> to <provider 1>, denoted as e1-1(item 1, service 1)
and e2-1(service 1, provider 1) respectively. As a result,
there is only one path p1 = (e1-1, e2-1) found from the
source data <item 1> to the service provider <provider
1> in the physical world2. Such a simple path does
not normally lead to any privacy issue since it merely
describes what data items are needed for a service to
happen. In the following examples, we will show how
non-trivial real privacy issues can be identified on more
complicated data flow graphs.
<O: provider 1>
<S: service 1>
<DP: item 1>
providedBy
1-1
2-1
p1(e1-1, e2-1)
Figure 2: Example entity graph showing a data flow
<SP: provider a>
(group company)
<SP: provider 1> <SP: provider 2> <SP: provider 3>
<DP: item 2>
<DP: item 1> <DP: item 1> <DP: item 1>
<DP: item 2>
isPartOf
<DP: item 2>
<OS: service 1>
<DP: item 2>
<OS: service 2>
<DP: item 1>
providedBy providedBy
1-1
2-1
1-2
2-2
3-3 3-4
3-1 3-2p1(e1-1, e2-1)
p6(e1-2, e2-2,e3-4)
Figure 3: Entity graph in provider hierarchies
In real world, data flows can take place within a
corporate family (connected by the semantic relation
isPartOf ). Therefore, it may be the case that different
data items flow among multiple service providers and
aggregate at a single organization, which may be
unknown to the user thus leading to a privacy issue.
For instance, in Fig. 3, as <item 1> and <item 2>
flow to <service 1> and <service 2> separately, E2
2The path is shown as a dotted line in Fig. 2 from the source to the
destination, ignoring the entities in the middle. The same hereinafter
for other figures.
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flows e2-1(service 1, provider 1) and e2-2(service 2,
provider 2) take place. Then, E3 flows follow such as
e3-1(provider 1, provider 2), e3-2(provider 1, provider
3), e3-3(provider 2, provider 1) and e3-4(provider 2,
provider 3). Similarly, paths can be found from data
packages <item 1> and <item 2> to service providers,
<provider 1>, <provider 2> and <provider 3>, such
as p1 = (e1-1, e2-1) and p6 = (e1-2, e2-2, e3-4). Here
we use black and white edge labels to distinguish flows
about different data packages containing two different
data items. Inspecting the data flow graph, we see both
data packages flow to the organization <provider a>,
which may cause unknown disclosure of personal data.
Complex business models exist in the real world.
Figure 4 shows data flows among some business
partners who jointly support online services. As shown
in Fig. 4a), an E4 data flow e4-1(service a, service b)
can be found among the business partners connected
by an outsourcedTo semantic relation edge. Based on
an E2 flow e2-1(service b, provider b) and the service
ownership expressed with the semantic relation edge
belongTo, an E3 flow e3-1(provider b, provider a) can
be identified. Similarly, Figure 4b) shows E4 flows
that would incur due to the semantic relation edge
poweredBy between online services, e.g., e4-1(service
a, service 1) and e4-2(service a, service 2), while in
Fig. 4c), the only E4 flow e4-1(service 1, service 2) is
due to the semantic relation edge suppliedBy in between.
If any of business relations between S and O entities are
unknown, privacy concerns can arise.
To further illustrate how data flows in an entity level
graph can be used to identify privacy issues, Figure 5
shows a scenario where a customer (a P entity) books
flight tickets and hotels via online services provided
by organizations Booking.com and Agoda. Privacy
restrictions may be given to data items on pre-defined
labels, such as sensitive data items are not allowed
to share with more than 5 organizations. For this
purpose, data entities are categorized in the following
groups: Profile (Name, Age, Gender, and Email),
Event (Itinerary, Companion, Dates, and Spending),
Location (Destination, Landmark), Sensitive (Health),
and Entertainment (Tour, Food). Sensitive data such
as medical certificates may be required and shared
with third-party suppliers, in case travelers need special
medical assistance during travel. As a result, data
package <item 1> will flow to eleven service providers
along with paths p1 to p11. For instance, paths
p1 = (e1-1, e4-1, e2-1), p2 = (e1-1, e4-1, e2-1, e3-1) and
p10 = (e1-1, e4-1, e2-1, e3-9) can respectively lead data
package <item 1> to <GoToGate>, <Booking> and
<SuperSaver>. Besides, the Agoda hotel booking
service may incur data flows to seven service providers
<SP: provider a>
<OS: service a>
<DP: item 1>
<SP: provider b>
belongTo
outsourcedTo
<OS: service b>
providedBy
1-1
2-1
4-1
3-1
p1(e1-1, e4-1, e2-1)
p2(e1-1, e4-1, e2-1, e3-1)
(a)
<SP: provider a>
<OS: service a>
<SP: provider 1>
<DP: item 1>
<SP: provider 2>
poweredBy
belongTo
poweredBy
<OS: service 1> <OS: service 2>
providedByprovidedBy
1-1
4-1 4-2
2-1 2-2
3-1 3-2
(b)
<SP: provider 1>
<OS: service 1>
<DP: item 1>
<SP: provider 2>
suppliedBybelongTo
<OS: service 2>
providedBy
1-1
4-1
2-1
3-1
(c)
Figure 4: Example entity graphs of supply chains
(led by paths p12 to p18), such as p12 = (e1-2, e2-2)
and p13 = (e1-2, e2-2, e3-11) running to <Agoda> and
<Kayak>. This may cause location privacy leakage if
an O entity has the access to the user’s <name> and
<destination> simultaneously.
3.2. Unwanted disclosures to other people
In addition to privacy issues raised from data
collection by service providers and data shared among
services and organizations, online privacy issues may
also be caused by unwanted data disclosures to other
people e.g. on OSNs. Figure 6 is an entity level graph
showing how the P entity <me> connects with other
people through online and offline relations. Based on the
friend relations between <fb abc> and <ig abc>, E6
data flows such as e6-4(fb abc, fb edward), e6-5(ig abc,
ig ed1989) could take place in the cyber space when
“I” use Facebook and Instagram services and generate
data flows e1-1, e5-1, e1-2 and e5-2. Given the
account ownership, E7 flows such as e7-4(fb edward,
edward) and e7-5(ig ed1989, edward) will follow.
Along with paths p4 = (e1-1, e5-1, e6-4, e7-4) and
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<OS: booking_flight>
<SP: Booking><SP: GoToGate>
<OS: agoda_ accommodation>
<SP: Agoda>
<SP: Booking Holdings Inc.><SP: Kayak>
<SP: Princeline.com>
<SP: Rentalcars.com>
<DP: item1>
<DP: item2>
• companion
• destination
• Dates
• spending
<SP: HotelsCombined>
outsourcedTo
belongTo
isPartOf
providedBy
<SP: Etraveli Group>
<SP: mytrip.com>
<SP: flygresor.se>
<SP: SuperSaver>
isPartOf
<OS: gotogate_flight>
providedBy
• name
• age
• gender
• email
• health
• itinerary 
• trip purpose
1-14-1
2-1 3-1
3-2 3-7
3-8 3-10
1-2
2-2
3-11
<SP: TravelJigsaw>
sameAs
p1(e1-1, e4-1, e2-1)
p2(e1-1, e4-1, e2-1, e3-1)p10(e1-1, e4-1, e2-1, e3-9)
p12(e1-2, e2-2)
p13(e1-2, e2-2, e3-11)
3-17
Figure 5: An example entity graph about data sharing in the travel context
p5 = (e1-2, e5-2, e6-5, e7-5), it shows that both data
packages <item 1> and <item 2> will be disclosed
to <edward>. Therefore, “my” current location may
be inferred from the itinerary post on Facebook and
landmark photos shared on Instagram during the trip.
Data visibility can be managed by privacy policies
related to online friendships and memberships. As
a result, privacy leakage could be caused when “I”
permit unwanted access requests. Figure 7 shows
a scenario where online data are propagated across
groups that have members in common. Through
E9 flows e9-1(fb travel, fb alice) and e9-2(fb travel,
fb bob), Alice and Bob can view <item 3> once “I”
send it to the travel group. In some situations, <item
3> can be resent to other groups and cause the E8
flows, such a e8-2(fb bob, fb writing) and e8-3(fb carol,
fb work). Through the following E9 and E7 flows,
<item 3> may be disclosed wrong people through p4 =
(e1-3, e8-3, e9-4, e7-4).
4. Automated reasoning of privacy issues
Web ontology language (OWL) and semantic web
rule language (SWRL) are widely utilized in specifying
security and privacy policy constraints on data usage [6–
9]. In this section, we use OWL and SWRL to formalize
our model and show how reasoning can be done to detect
privacy issues automatically. For the sake of simplicity,
in this section we will focus on a subset of the entity
types and relations. We will also focus on only online
services (OS) and service providers (SP), so will use OS
for services (S) and SP for organizations (O).
Following OWL and SWRL, different components
in the proposed model can be defined as classes,
predicates (with domains and values) and instances, as
shown in Table 1. With the ontology and semantic
rules (Rules 1-10) developed in Prote´ge´ 4.0 we can
implement an automated semantic reasoning engine.
Through running the reasoner Pellet [10] and description
logic (DL) queries [11] on the knowledge base, implicit
relations (i.e., data flows) could be identified for privacy
assessment and decision making purposes. Assuming
that data flows to physical entities are likely causing
privacy issues, privacy questions can be made to look
for finalFlowTo (or access) in the result sets.
In dealing with scenarios related to service
providers, DL queries are utilized to answer the
following questions: “where the sensitive information
flows to?” and “who can access the user profile and
location at the same time?” Through reasoning on
the semantic graph of Fig. 5, the engine shows that
the number of service providers can be reduced by
changing <flight booking> to <flight agoda> as the
sensitive item <item 1> will be shared with one single
corporate group, as shown in Fig. 8. In a scenario about
purchasing travel service packages, Figure 9 shows the
result of comparing two service packages by running
queries to answer “who can access the user profile and
location at the same time?” Given the demand for
booking “flights + hotels”, the result sets show that
adopting Package 2 can better control the privacy risks.
In this case, query services can enhance user privacy by
splitting personal details contained in data flows.
Towards the privacy requirements in the scenarios
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<OA: fb_abc>
<OA: tw_dave>
<OA: fb_bob>
<OA: fb_edward><OA: fb_alice>
<OA: fb_carol>
<OA: ig_ed1989>
<P: edward>
<P: me>
<OA: ig_abc>
<P: alice>
<OA: tw_abc>
<P: dave>
<P:bob> <P: carol>
<DP: item1> • itinerary• mind state 
<DP: item2> • landmark
<OS: facebook>
<OS: instagram>
knows
account
account
friend
account
account
friend
1-1
5-1
6-1
6-2 6-3
6-4
7-2
7-1
7-3
7-4
1-2
5-2
6-5
7-5
10-1
p4(e1-1, e5-1, e6-4, e7-4)
p5(e1-2, e5-2, e6-5, e7-5)
Figure 6: An example entity graph showing unwanted data disclosure on OSNs
Table 1: Definitions of classes, predicates and instances to represent different components of the proposed model
Class (Domain) Predicate Range Instance
Data Package(DP) flowTo
finalFlowTo
has
OA, OG, OS
P, SP
D
item1, item2, item3, ...
Data(D) construct (↔ has) DP itinerary, email, name, date of birth, ...
Online Account(OA) account
friend
P
OA
fb alice, tw dave, ig ed1989, ...
Online Group(OG) member OA fb travel, fb writing, fb work, ...
Online Service(OS) belongTo
providedBy
outsourcedTo
poweredBy
suppliedBy
create
exist
SP
SP
OS
OS
OS
OA
OG
flight booking, accommodation agoda, facebook, twitter,
instagram, ...
Service Provider(SP) isPartOf
access (↔ finalFlowTo)
SP
DP
Booking, Agoda, TripAdvisor, ...
Person(P) know
access (↔ finalFlowTo)
P
DP
alice, bob, me, dave, edward, ...
concerning unwanted data disclosures to other people,
DL queries can be applied to check things such as
if someone else can access certain data combinations
or if entertainment-related messages are disclosed to
colleagues. As illustrated in Fig. 10, through querying
on recipients who can access two data types during
the same period, the system is expected to provide
privacy suggestions such as blocking Facebook account
fb edward so as to stop such disclosure to Edward in
the real world (see Fig. 6). Similarly, a DL query can
be made to check if certain data will flow to unwanted
groups (recipients). As a result, it shows <item 3> has
breached personal privacy and thus demands for extra
modification, like removing entertainment information
from the Facebook post to <fb travel>.
1. DP(?d), flowTo(?d, ?s), providedBy(?s, ?p)
→finalFlowTo(?d, ?p)
2. DP(?d), flowTo(?d, ?s), outsourcedTo(?s, ?s1),
providedBy(?s1, ?p)→finalFlowTo(?d, ?p)
3. DP(?d), flowTo(?d, ?s), poweredBy(?s, ?s1),
providedBy(?s1, ?p)→finalFlowTo(?d, ?p)
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<OA: fb_abc>
<OA: fb_alice>
<OA: fb_bob>
<OA: fb_carol>
<OA: fb_edward>
<P: me>
<P: alice>
<P: bob>
<P: carol>
<P: edward>
<VG: fb_travel>
<VG: fb_writing >
<VG: fb_work>
<DP: item3> • landmark
• tour
<OS: facebook>
member
account
1-1
8-1
9-1
9-2
1-2 8-2
1-3
8-3
9-3
9-4
7-1
7-2
7-3
7-4
p4(e1-3, e8-3, e9-4, e7-4)
p2(e1-1, e8-1, e9-2, e7-2)
Figure 7: Entity graph of cross-group data disclosure
Figure 8: Example query on sensitive data disclosures
4. DP(?d), flowTo(?d, ?s), suppliedBy(?s, ?s1),
providedBy(?s1, ?p)→ finalFlowTo(?d, ?p)
5. SP(?p), isPartOf(?p, ?q), isPartOf(?r, ?q),
finalFlowTo(?d, ?p)→ finalFlowTo(?d, ?r)
6. DP(?d), flowTo(?d, ?s), finalFlowTo(?d, ?p1),
belongTo(?s, ?p)→ finalFlowTo(?d, ?p)
7. DP(?d), flowTo(?d, ?a), account(?a, ?p)
→finalFlowTo(?d, ?p)
Figure 9: Example query on combined data disclosures
Figure 10: Example query on unintended disclosures
8. DP(?d), finalFlowTo(?d, ?p), know(?p, ?p1)
→finalFlowTo(?d, ?p1)
9. DP(?d), flowTo(?d, ?s), create(?s, ?a), friend(?a,
?a1)→flowTo(?d, ?a1)
10. DP(?d), flowTo(?d, ?g), member(?g, ?a)
→flowTo(?d, ?a)
5. Related work
The most related area is privacy ontologies, which
often involve a graph-based model. Most work on this
topic mainly focuses on specifying conditions of data
access by the controllers. For instance, ontological
models can be built to incorporate privacy causes,
impacts and contextual factors. Sacco and Passant
(2011) proposed a privacy preference ontology (PPO) to
allow users specify fine-grained conditions of using of
their RDF data [12]. To effectively combine data (or
knowledge) of different sources in the cyber security
domain, a knowledge graph STUCCO was built up
with data from 13 structured sources [13]. To ensure
Page 6535
privacy criteria of different stakeholders are properly
implemented, Kost et al. integrated an ontology into
privacy policy specifications and the evaluation of
privacy constraints [14]. Michael et al. proposed a
privacy ontology to support the provision of privacy and
derive the privacy levels associated with e-commerce
transactions and applications [3]. To guarantee business
processes are performed securely, Ioana et al. designed
a semantic annotation tool to assist users in specifying
security and privacy constraints onto different business
process models [15]. As far as we know, no existing
ontologies consider how likely privacy issues are caused
from user-centric data flows like we report in this paper.
Reasoning from background knowledge on human
relationships, content types and contextual factors
can support decision making on authorization and
privacy preservation. Passant et al. [16] utilized
semantic vocabularies such as FOAF (friend of a
friend) and SIOC (Semantically Interlinked Online
Communities) to establish a trust and privacy layer
to restrict publishing, sharing or browsing data by
various social behaviors. By categorizing privacy
violations of OSNs as endogenous and exogenous
information disclosures in a direct or an indirect way,
an agent-based representation was proposed based on
users’ privacy requirements on their generated contents
[17]. Considering that limited privacy requirements
can be expressed through access control policies,
semantic data models have been suggested to assist
in authorization to reduce leakage risks [18]. To
anonymize e-health records with statistical disclosure
control (SDC) methods, the healthcare terminology
SNOMED CT3 was incorporated into a privacy ontology
to mask categorical attributes and preserve information
utility [19]. To help designers understand security
mechanisms and how well they are aligned with
corporate missions, the ontology is also modelled
about information systems and settings on permission,
delegation, and trust at the organizational level [20].
Another closely related research area is OSN
(structural) anonymity. Focusing on OSN data
protection, Qian et al. [21] proposed individual network
snapshots. In case sensitive attributes are inferred
by attackers, distance between published data and
background knowledge needs to be controlled in a
safe range. Noticing that anonymized graphs may
incur identification attacks, Peng et al. [22] developed
a two-staged algorithm: constructing a sub-graph of
users (seed) and connecting to the rest (grow) to show
the feasibility. User similarities are shared among
“neighbors”. As a result, knowing neighbor nodes
3http://www.snomed.org/snomed-ct/
five-step-briefing
and attached attributes can increase the probability
of identification central users [23]. In addition
to static relations, “contact graphs” are formalized
with contextual factors in mobility [24]. Similarly,
graph representations storing user interactions over
OSNs should be protected against privacy attacks
[25]. Singh and Zhan analyzed the vulnerability
to identity attacks based on topological properties
[26]. Instead of modeling network graphs, Li et al.
converted tabular data in data graphs, including original
datasets, anonymity datasets and background knowledge
of attackers [27]. Instead of direct anonymity on
graphs, our goal is to offer users a knowledge graph
about data flows to reflect their activities in the wider
business world (online and offline). Since our approach
effectively combines the ontological formalization about
data flows, graph-based structures of service providers
and people as well as a knowledge base with semantic
meanings to support automatic reasoning on potential
issues individual users care about, we believe that this
model can support further development of user-centric
privacy-enhancement applications on personal devices,
for the purposes such as monitoring data-related
activities through different mobile apps.
6. Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we propose a user-centric, graph-based
semantic model to identify data flows produced from
a given user’s online and offline activities that can
potentially lead to privacy issues. In the conceptual
model, privacy issues concerning the given user can
be represented as specific topological patterns involving
one or more data-flow paths. The model is generic
enough to be applied to a wider range of scenarios,
some of which were given in this paper to illustrate how
it can be used. We also demonstrate that the model
can be easily implemented using OWL tools to enable
automatic semantic reasoning of privacy issues. We plan
to conduct some future work such as the following.
Enriched the ontological model: More entity types
and relations; more complicated business models; more
complicated inter-personal relations; more complicated
data structures; incorporation of a legal framework for
data protection and privacy laws.
Explicit benefit returns: The proposed model
implicitly covers some benefits, e.g. disclosing data to
a service provider to get a desired (i.e. personalized)
service by return. Therefore, more quantitative and
explicit benefit/value returns can be added to allow
consider privacy issues in a more contextualized manner
and to do better reasoning.
Invisible data flows: This work mainly focuses on
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data flows caused by visible data sharing. However,
it is necessary to monitor invisible or implicit data
disclosures that can happen without users’ explicit
knowledge, such as disclosing a use’s IP address without
giving a separate explicit notice.
Connecting multiple models together: Finally, given
a number of users in the real-world CPS, it is possible
to connect their user-centric graphs to form a larger
graph showing how privacy issues change from person
to person, which will help study larger-scale privacy
issues, e.g., how privacy issues of one user propagate
to his/her fiends on OSNs.
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